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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS: A CRITIC'S
VIEWPOINT
Milton Handler*

W

HEN Judge Bell invited me to address this Conference, I accepted with alacrity because coming to Atlanta-a city I have
never had the pleasure of visiting before-is for me a sentimental
journey. Many of my colleagues at the Columbia Law School, particularly in the early years of my teaching, came from Georgia or neighboring states. For a quarter of a century, Young Berryman Smith, a native
Atlantan, served as dean of our law school. Jerome Michael, from
Athens, joined the faculty in 1927, at the same time that I commenced
my own teaching. Elliott Cheatham of this city was a colleague for
several decades. Huger Jervey, who succeeded Justice Stone as dean,
hailed from Charleston. Noel Dowling, one of the great constitutional
lawyers of our time, was born in Alabama. These talented scholars and
gifted teachers provided leadership and direction to the Columbia
faculty for a generation and, as teachers and colleagues of mine, laid the
solid foundation for my own career. And so I say that my Alma Mater as
well as modem legal education are deeply in the debt of the South.
This is the fortieth year of my antitrust ministry. During these
decades I have traveled throughout this land, and Europe as well, discussing every conceivable phase of my specialty. I have discoursed on
"Abstraction and Atonality in Modern Antitrust," but, frankly, the law
seems to get more dissonant and less pictorial all the time. I have talked
about "Antitrust in Perspective" and "Some Unresolved Problems of
Antitrust," but the distortions remain while the problems needing
* This article constitutes the text of an address delivered on May 10, 1967 before the
Judidal Conference of the United States Courts of the Fifth Judicial Circuit and is based
on a paper presented on April 14, 1967 to the Antitrust Section of the American Bar
Association as part of a symposium on the Supreme Court and Antitrust from the viewpoints of expositor, critic and defender.
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resolution continue to mount. I once jocularly remarked that the only
topic I had not dealt with is The Antitrust Laws and A Ham Sandwich.
In light of recent developments in the law of tie-ins, I am not sure that
there may not be antitrust implications in the sale of such a sandwich
although it is a bit difficult to determine whether the bread or the meat
is the tying or the tied product. Moreover, if a lawyer buys the sandwich
from a restaurant client, there may be ominous overtones of reciprocity.
In an address delivered several years ago, Mr. Justice Harlan invited
the bar to voice its criticisms of the work of the judiciary: "Constructive
criticism of judicial decisions," he wrote, "is a good thing for the
judiciary and for healthy development of the law. Only a warped
judicial outlook could think otherwise."' I have decided to accept his
invitation and I shall speak today about the Supreme Court and antitrust from the viewpoint of the critic. Just as a defender must be more
than a mere apologist, a constructive critic is expected to rise above
sheer captiousness, and th'ht shall be my purpose in what I have to say.
In connection with a study recently made by me, I consulted my
computer to find out how many antitrust opinions are to be found in
the United States Reports. The number is approximately 400, omitting
those dealing primarily with minor procedural or jurisdictional issues.2
The Court split in about half of the cases, which is readily understandable considering the controversial nature of the issues litigated. In the
long years of my teaching, I have read and reread these opinions many
times. Some of them are like major pieces of music-no matter how
many times one hears them, there is still something new to be discovered. I took a Gallup poll of myself to determine the extent of my
disagreement with'the Court, and used as my yardstick whether I would
have voted with or against the Court had I been one of its members at
the time of decision. Unexpectedly I found that I should have been in
dissent in comparatively few of the cases so far as result is concerned,
putting aside my reservations concerning their ratio decidendi. The
overall verdict of history is quite favorable to the Court's total antitrust
accomplishment.3 This is another way of saying that judicial opinions,
1 Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49
A.B.A.J. 943, 945 (1963).
2

Interestingly, more than half of these decisions have been since 1946.

a See Llewellyn, Legal Traditions and Social Science Method in ESSAYS ON RESEIACH IN
TH SocIAL SaLEcus 89, 117-19 (1931), quoted in LLEWELLYN, TnE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPFis 386 (1960):

Whatever wisdom the court exercises is taken for granted, sinks out of sight, is
honored by burial, or oblivion. But to the court's mistakes the trumpets blare-and
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like good whiskey, can improve with age. Lest you get the false impression that I am uncharacteristically full of sweetness and light today,
let me hasten to add that there are plenty of judgments that wear
poorly. With those the critic must deal severely. 4
I do want to emphasize, however, that there is much to criticize in
the work of earlier Courts just as there is with regard to the present one,
and that decisions frustrating our antitrust goals are no less objectionable than rulings prohibiting arrangements having no real anti-competitive impact.

II
In evaluating seventy-seven years of antitrust adjudications, it may be
convenient to divide our story into five chapters--() the period before
1911; (2) from 1911 to 1920; (3) the years of normalcy and inaction;
(4) the New Deal days through the forties; and (5) from 1950 to date.
The key issues in the first and formative period were the jurisdictional scope and the substantive reach of the new legislation. Whenever
one feels that the modern Court has goofed, he can take solace in the
fact that, in LaGuardia's picturesque word, the mistake made in United
States v. Knight,5 where manufacture was held not to be commerce, was
really a "beaut." The principal question mooted in the early cases was
whether there should be any rule of reason.0 The unsound notion that
all restraints of trade were to be forbidden was short-lived; an exception
was promptly made in favor of the ancillary restrictions.7 Also excluded
blare again.-I do not quarrel with this. The court has need of it. Yet if a scientist
is interested in his perspective he must look to the rest of the court's work as well.
Excavations among the legal records will yield their buried treasure, and without
Sstint.....
Let me be dear. I share the criticism. I sputter scorn and dismay Into,
the trumpet, as you do. But I would have you, as reasonable accountants, tote up
the credit column before You judge the 'net worth of the judges' work.
4 "[W]hile it is proper that people should find fault when their judges fail, it Is only
reasonable that they should recognize the difficulties.... Let them be severely brought
to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will take the trouble to understand them:'
Judge Learned Hand, quoted in 1960 Sup. Cr. REV. ii.
5 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 US. 1 (1895). The baleful influence of this
precedent while mot seriously bloddng the path of antitrust development, was felt in the
constitutional area for several generations, and it took the judicial revolution of 1937 to
undo its mischief. "
6 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Add)ston Pipe & Steel Co., 85
Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.), aff'd, 175 US. 21i (1899).
7 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See also, United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., szipra note 6. Compare Cindnnati, Portsmouth,Big
Sandy ;&:omeroy Packet Co. v. Bi, 200 U.S. 19 (1906) (sustained ancillary covenant not

.
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were normal and usual business arrangements whose effect on commerce was "but indirect and incidental" and whose purpose was fairly
and properly to regulate the business of the parties." In retrospect we
now better perceive that the promulgation of the rule of reason in
Standard of New Jersey9 was not the abrupt departure from the earlier
rulings that contemporary opinion thought it to be. Peckham's imprecise "indirect and incidental" criterion was not radically different from
White's condemnation of undue limitations on competitive conditions,
although the two concepts were not identical.
Our deep interest in the origins of the rule of reason should not
obscure the fact that in the short space of fourteen years from 1897 to
1911 the Court made some very solid and substantial contributions to
our substantive antitrust law. In rapid succession, it declared unlawful
horizontal arrangements among sellers or buyers fixing prices, 10 dividing
12
markets and allocating customers; 1 it outlawed concerted boycotts;
it forbade vertical price agreements;' 3 it condemned stock acquisitions
14
by major competitive factors lacking any monopoly power; it sus-

tained recovery of the overcharge in private treble damage actions
predicated on price fixing;1 5 it upheld price restrictions in patent
license agreements;' 5 and it put beyond the purview of antitrust, restrictive conduct permitted by the laws of foreign lands in which it took
17
place.
To produce this corpus juris.8 in so short a time is a tribute both to
to compete), with Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423 (1908) (condemned
ancillary covenant not to compete when executed pursuant to plan to monopolize).
8 Hopkins v. UnitedStates, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898); Anderson v. United StAtes, 171
U.S. 604, 615 (1898).
9 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
10 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Swift 8: Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 875 (1905).
11 United State§ w Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899), affirming 85 Fed.
271 (6th Cir. 1898).
12 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.. 38 (1904).
18 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park ScSons Co., 220 US. 373 (1911). See also
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (copyright law does not permit copyright
owner to fix resale prices).
14 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See also Minnesota v.
Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904); Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197
U.S. 244 (1905).
15 Chattanooga Foundry &cPipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 890 (1906).
10 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
17 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.. 347 (1909).
18 Mention should also be made of Connolly v, Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 'U.S, 540
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the Court and to the enforcement authorities. It is worthy of note that
none of these rulings was overturned by Standard Oil of New Jersey,
although, to be sure, some have been tarnished by time. 0 It is instructive to contrast these significant achievements with the dearth of rulings
during the initial experience of the Common Market with the antitrust
20
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.
I can best illustrate the trends during the second and third periods
by a review of the antitrust decisions during the 1926 Term of Court,
when I served as law clerk to Justice Stone. In Trenton Potteries,21
Charles Evans Hughes, as counsel for the defense, vigorously argued for
affirmance of the Second Circuit's determination that the rule of reason
sheltered price fixing by a group controlling upwards of 80% of its
market provided the prices so set were themselves reasonable. The
Court sharply divided on this issue despite the fact that both in the
early railroad cases22 and in Justice Hughes' own opinion in Miles
Medical,2 3 the reasonableness of prices when either horizontally or
vertically fixed, had been held to be immaterial. Holmes joined the
majority, and then most reluctantly, after reading the draft of Stone's
opinion. Had he cast his lot with the minority, the decision below in
(1902) (enabled an illegal combination to recover the purchase price of goods sold) and
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909) (buyer avoided
payment for goods purchased where contract of sale was an inherent part of seller's
'illegal combination).

The 1912 decisions are also in the strong tradition of the pre-standard Oil cases. See
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 883 (1912) (interdicted a combination
controlling all terminal railroad facilities at Saint Louis); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 US. 20 (1912) (prohibited price fixing and boycotts under the cloak
of colorable patent license agreements); United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S. 61
(1912) (invalidated Union Pacific's acquisition of 46 per cent of Southern Pacific's stock);
United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912) (concerted action by a combination
of railroads to prevent construction of a competing road held unlawful). It is noteworthy
that in the one aberrational decision of that year, Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1
(1912) (upheld sale of patented machine with restriction requiring use of seller's supplies),
Chief Justice White dissented.
19 E.g., Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.'347 (1909). See chapters 7 and 9 of HA.LAm, CASES AND
MATERIAIS ON TRADE REGULAToN (4th ed. 1967).
- 20 See Handler, Varieties of Antitrust Experience. 19 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 299 (1964).
21 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); accord, FTC v. Pacific
States'Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 US. 52 (1927); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (a monopolist's unilateral refusal to deal, when part
of a scheme to monopolize, held unlawful).
22 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n. 166 U.S. 290, 323-25 (1897); United
States v.'Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 565 (1898).
23 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.. 220 U.S. 373. 408, 412 (1911).
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favor of the defendants would have been affirmed by an equally divided
Court. It is interesting thus to speculate as to the course of future antitrust development if Trenton Potteries, the keystone of modern antitrust, had ended so ignominiously.
At the same Term, the Court inexplicably upheld a decree as "in
harmony with law" which left undisturbed a 64% market share attained by the defendant through a series of horizontal acquisitions.2 4
This decision stripped the Sherman Act of effectiveness ixi curbing
those mergers which patently jeopardized the competitive structure of
industry.25 In Western Meat Co. 26 and Thatcher Glass,27 the Court
broadened the loophole in Section 7 of the Clayton Act by holding that
the Federal Trade Commission was ousted of jurisdiction over stock
acquisitions where the stock was exchanged for assets before the final
order. But for these unwise rulings, the enactment of the Antimerger
Law of 1950 might well have been unnecessary and the polarities of
1927 might not have been matched by the counterpolarities of our
current merger jurisprudence. 28
The twenties were the years of normalcy and inaction, with the Antitrust Division manned by a corporal's guard and with annual appropriations running in the neighborhood of $250,000.29 The Court's decisions, in part, mirrored the public's apathy towards antitrust and up.
held arrangements which we recognize today are antithetical to our
basic goals.3 0 Conditions were thus ripe for the vigorous, imaginative
and resourceful enforcement programs of Thurman Arnold when he
24 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
25 See Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 52 COLm. L. Rtv. 179,
238-41 (1932).
26 FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).

27 Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); cf. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
274 US. 619 (1927) (no divestiture of assets under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
28 See Handler, The Polaritiesof Antitrust, 60 Nw. U. L. REv, 751 (1966). Also decided
at this Term were United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), a precedent
much battered today; United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (antitrust
laws applied to importation of foreign goods where importers had monopoly power):
and Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) (Colorado criminal statute prohibiting
trade restraints unless "reasonable" profits cannot otherwise be obtained held unconsti.
tutionally vague).
29 See HAMILTON & TILL, ANTImTUST IN AcriON 23 (TNEC Monograph No. 16 1940).
So E.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421 (1920); Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922); Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926), FTC v. Western Meat
Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927); United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
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took over the administration of antitrust in the mid-30's. I do not pause
to review the vast outpouring of judicial decisions which followed this
massive enforcement effort. With minor exceptions, the decisions of the
thirties and forties advanced the cause of antitrust while exhibiting the
moderation and balance which were the hallmarks of such titans as
Brandeis, Hughes and Stone. The outstanding achievement was the
supremacy accorded antitrust in its perennial and inevitable clash with
the patent laws.3 '
I turn now to the modem period with special emphasis on the work
of the Warren Court. Here again, from the viewpoint of substantive
law, the doctrines developed in these extremely active years have been
neither all good nor all bad. Although the Court in some of the blockbuster litigations has forged new ground, especially in the merger field,
most of its work has consisted of reaffirming, clarifying and strengthening the rules inherited from its predecessors. It is true that the philosophy of per se illegality has been in the ascendancy. But it would be a
mistake to conclude that there has been an outright rejection of the
moderate views associated with Taft, Stone, Hughes and Brandeis. One
need only remember that the modem Court is responsible for Theatre
33 Tampa Electric,
3 4 Kelly v. Kosuga,3 5
3s Times-Picayune,
Enterprises,
Noerr36 and White Motor.3 7 To be sure, during the same era, the,Court
has produced decisions like Kiefer-Stewart,38 McKesson & Robbinsn
Parke Davis,40 Klor's4 ' and Northern Pacific,- which have tightened
31

See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); MacGregor v.

Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg.
iCo., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945);

United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 US. 6S0 (1944); Sola Elee. Co. v. Jefferson
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942);
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States. 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
32 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
33 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
34 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
35 358 U.S. 516 (1999).
36 Eastern R.R.-Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US. 127 (1961).
37 White-Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
38-Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). While the dedsion is praiseworthy for its outfight condemnation of price-fixing, its reliance on the
doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy is unfortunate. See Handler, Some misadventures
in Antitrust Policy-making- Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 Yr.a .J.9-, 119.22 (1966).
.. 39 United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
40 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 862 US. 29 (1960).
A'-Klor's, Inc. v. Bioadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.. 207 (1959).
42 Northern Pacific R.R. v. Uniied" Siates, 356-U.S. 1 (1958).
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the rules appertaining to the hard core Section 1 offenses. This duality
has been salutary. While the current condemnations of price fixing,
division of markets and boycotts are perhaps more explicit and less
qualified, they were foreshadowed by the earlier decisions and merely
continued the mainstream of antitrust development. Though sympathetic to the Government's desires that its burden of proof be eased, the
Court nonetheless has refused to read conspiracy out of the Sherman
Act, and substitute for it consciously parallel behavior.43 Conspiracy
44
still presupposes an agreement.
An example of the Court's significant contributions in the area of
Section 1 offenses is Northern Pacific,45 in which Mr. Justice Black ap-

plied his keen analytical powers to the legality of tying arrangements.
The opinion commences with the memorable and oft-quoted restatement of antitrust's objectives, compressing volumes of content into two
sentences:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
40
democratic political and social institutions.
Turning to the rules properly applicable to tie-ins, the Court rejected
the prior analysis which had conditioned illegality on a finding of
monopoly power or market dominance in the tying product. It recognized that a tie-in is an involuntary restraint based essentially upon
economic duress; 47 the buyer, if he wants the tying product, must purchase the tied product as well. Since, in Justice Frankfurter's words,
"tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition," 48 they should be unlawful regardless of the seller's
43 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).

44 See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, 63 MicH. L. REV. 59, 85-88 (1964).
45 Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
46 Id. at 4.

47 As early as Chief Justice Parker's opinion in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181,
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711), the common law distinguished between involuntary and

voluntary restraints.
48 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), quoted
in Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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market share so long as they produce an appreciable restraint,4 0 barring
50
Of course, the buyer
some exceptional justification as in Jerrold.
should be free to purchase a full line if he so desires, as Justice Black
duly noted; 51 such a voluntary foreclosure of competition is not
actionable. NorthernPacific exemplifies the utility of a per se approach,
providing a simple rule, easily enforced, where an involuntary arrange-

ment impinges upon economic freedom and has no redeeming virtue.
Nevertheless, the Court has wisely refused to add to the list of per se
Section 1 offenses on a purely conceptual basis without adequate factual
foundation. In White Motor,52 the Couri refused to interdict as per se

unlawful vertical territorial restraints, quoting from Brandeis' celebrated synthesis of the rule of reason,5 3 and indicating that it needed
more knowledge before it could hold that arrangements for orderly
marketing could never be justified. 4
And in Noerr,55 Justice Black, the leading exponent of per se rules
and absolute prohibitions, adopted a new methodology which, like the
rule of reason that is anathema to him, provides the flexibility without
which antitrust could not endure.

Noerr involved a conspiracy on the part of one industry to destroy
the competitive opportunities of another. The conspiracy, however,

instead of being carried out in the market place, was executed through
49 "[DV'e do not construe [Times-Picayune] as requiring anything more than sufflcient
economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product
(assuming all the time, of course that a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce
is affected).. .. [The vice of tying arrangements lies in the use of economic power in
one market to restrict competition on the merits in another regardless of the source from
which the power is derived and whether the power takes the form of a monopoly or not."
Id. at 11. See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 US. 38, 45 (192).
50 Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. United States, 365 US. 567 (1961), aff'g per curiam,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See also Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir.
1962); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); cf. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
dismissed, 881 US. 125 (1965).
51 Northern Pacific R-R. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 6, n.4. "Of course where the buyer
is free to take either product by itself there is no tying problem even though the seller
may also offer the two items as a unit at a single price." Ibid.
52 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 US. 253, 261 (1965).
53 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 US. 231, 238 (1918).
54 The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US.
365 (1967), handed down after the delivery of this address, leaves White Motor somewhat
battered. Whether Schwinn is a repudiation of the philosophy of Chicago Board of Trade
and White Motor, or merely a narrow ruling on the legitimacy of the challenged vertical
restraints will be covered at length in the author's Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review.
55 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US. 127 (1961).
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political means by appeals to the legislature, the executive and the
public. To Justice Black the right of petition and speech transcended
the interest in competition and therefore the challenged conduct was
held to fall outside the scope of antitrust.
The rule of reason is nothing more than a sophisticated balancing of
conflicting interests each having its own claim to recognition, its own
inherent logic and its own set of priorities. The courts recognized as
far back as 171 156 that neither freedom of contract nor freedom of trade
was an absolute. Freedom of contract prevailed where the restraint was
not unreasonable; freedom of trade came out on top when the restriction imposed an undue limitation on competition. While there is a
sharp philosophic difference between this methodology and that followed in Noerr, from a practical point of view it makes little difference
whether concerted action is held sheltered because it is beyond antitrust's reach or because it can be justified under an appropriate rule of
reason inquiry. The significant fact is that the conduct is not unlawful.
I now turn to the other side of the picture. The seeds of many of the
later doctrines and procedures to which the antitrust bar has taken the
sharpest exception are to be found in Standard Stations.5 7 It is ironic
that Justice Frankfurter, the Court's most articulate spokesman for
judicial restraint, should have furnished the conceptual apparatus for
the judicial extremism which characterizes modem antitrust.
The narrow issue in Standard Stations was the -effect to be accorded
the qualifying language of Section 3 of the Clayton Act in its application to exclusive dealing arrangements. The Court, in my submission,
posed the wrong question for decision and -thus came to the wrong
result. To the Justice the question was whether exclusive dealing had a
greater anticompetitive impact than alternative marketing arrangements. This, he felt, was'an issue which the courts were ill equipped to
handle. Accordingly, he adopted the comparative quantitative test for
measuring the legality of an exclusive, and compounded this error by a
misreading of legislative history. 58 The proper question for decision was
whether the exclusives under attack denied competing suppliers reasonable access to retail outlets and thus to the consuming public. This
is the type of question which virtually all antitrust cases pose and can be
56 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 847 (KJ1. 1711).
57 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 180-84 (1954); HANDLEt,
ANTITRUST IN PERsPECTvE 29-48 (1957).

58 See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YAL
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judicially determined without resort to slide-rule formulae. The
Clayton Act's qualifying language was a built-in rule of reason. By
denigrating its purpose and effect the Court went far toward converting
the Act into a per se statute.
The mischief of Standard Stations permeates our current antitrust
jurisprudence. It minimizes the importance of the facts; it disregards
economic realities; and it raises ease of enforcement to the paramount
position in antitrust administration. This is particularly evident in the
recent merger rulings, in which the Court has discarded the factual
approach initially adopted in Brown Shoe,50 developing in its place a
network of mechanical rules, all designed to invalidate corporate acquisitions.
Perhaps even more significantly, the logic of Standard Stations has
culminated in the recent revolutionary ruling of the Court in the
second Brown Shoe case,60 where it was held that exclusive dealing
arrangements may be forbidden by the Federal Trade Commission,
even where there are no likely anticompetitive effects within the meaning of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. With this decision, the qualifying
clause found in that legislation has for all practical purposes been
obliterated.
Inl
Having regard for the nature of the questions that come before the
Court, it is not surprising that its rulings evoke dissent from within
and severe criticism from without. The critic, however, must keep the

total picture in mind. Because he finds himself in disagreement with
particular rulings, he must not disregard the Court's signal achievements in adapting the law to the needs of our day, its important contributions to our jurisprudence, and the high intellectual level of its
opinions. A balanced appraisal takes account of that which merits
applause as well as that which deserves criticism.
We have frequently heard it said that the Court is result-oriented
and that it is unduly activist in its approach to the judicial function.
These characterizations are over-simplifications and are as unilluminating as the dichotomy often drawn between judicial liberals and conservatives. Any judge worthy of his salt is result-oriented in that he is
concerned with the consequences of his rulings. Without some activism
I 9 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Handler, Fiftenth Annual
Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 PEcoR or N.Y.C.BA. 411, 435-41 (1962).
60 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 884 US. 316 (1966). See Handler. Some Misadventures in
Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 YA.E .J. 92, 93-101 (1956).
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there would be sterility in our legal institutions and a mounting deficit
in social reform. Holmes taught us that everything is a matter of degree.
Life teaches, however, that there can be too much of a good thing.
What particularly troubles many of the Court's critics is its methodology. Eminent scholars from many fields have commented upon the
tendency towards over-generalization, the disrespect for precedent, even
those of recent vintage, the needless obscurity of opinions, the discouraging lack of candor, the disdain for the fact finding of the lower
courts, the tortured reading of statutes, and the seeming absence of
neutrality and objectivity.6 1 These observations can readily be documented in antitrust.62
In a number of recent antitrust opinions the Court has gone out of
its way to rest its decisions on the broadest possible grounds. In so
doing, it becomes the prisoner of its own untested slogans which can
only hamper a painstaking examination of new fact situations in the
light of fresh experience. No one objects to a scholarly synthesis of
prior precedents and the formulation of instructive guidelines. But,
as the Court itself recognized in White Motor, 3 synthesis should await
the accumulated knowledge resulting from the historic process of inclusion and exclusion. The great judicial craftsmen proceeded from the
particular to the general; they preserved the maximum freedom to reshape their rules in the face of greater understanding; they avoided the
tyranny of labels; they were slaves to neither logic nor history; they
responded to the pressure of the facts; the issue to them was whether
the differences between the case at bar and earlier decisions' rose to
the level of a legal distinction-in short, they were pragmatists and not
philosophical absolutists. Nonetheless, they never hesitated to capture
the spirit of the authorities, though often conflicting, in a luminous
generalization giving direction to future development.
An example of the Court's present technique is to be found in Consolidated Foods.6 4 The narrow question before the Court was the
legality of a conglomerate merger. The Federal Trade Commission
61 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAv TRADrrION: DFCIDING APPEALs 384-93 (1960);
Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, 31 N.Y.S. B. BuLL. 66 (1959); Griswold, Morrisson
Lecture, 43 MAss. L.Q. 97 (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
62 No commentator is as critical of the Court's work as are the dissenting Justices. See,
e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting):
"The sole consistency that I can find [in the Court's merger decisions] is that in litigation
under § 7, the Government always wins."
63 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
64 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss3/2

12

1967]

Handler: The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws: A Critic's Viewpoint

SUPREME COURT AND ANTITRUST LAWS

351

found that the acquisition produced a market structure conducive to
reciprocity which the acquiring company had, as matter of fact, utilized,
with the result that a substantial threat to competition was present.
Instead of resting its decision on the facts found by the Commission,
the Court commenced its opinion with the unqualified statement that
reciprocity "is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which
the antitrust laws are aimed."' ' This broad generalization has led at
least one district court to hold that all reciprocity, whether coercive or
voluntary, is unlawful where a not insubstantial amount of commerce
is involved. 66 Indeed, it has encouraged the view that a potential for
reciprocity, without more, invalidates a conglomerate acquisition. 7 It
plainly was premature for the Court, in the very first case in which
reciprocity was a factor, to generalize about its possible illegality, particularly since it did not even pause to define what conduct is embraced
by the term. On the other hand, if the Court had no intention of
condemning the practice outright, however defined, its loose language
produces unnecessary uncertainty. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis' celebrated bon mot,"" it is not the Supreme Court's function to introduce
confusion into the law.
The Pabst case, 69 involving Pabst's acquisition of Blatz, is another
example of a broadly based decision which cried out for a narrower
rationale. One of the key issues in Pabst was whether the State of Wisconsin constituted a relevant geographic market. Rather than addressing itself to the record facts on this issue, the Court adopted a sweeping
construction of the statutory phrase "section of the country" which in
effect dispensed with the necessity for finding any economically meaningful geographic market in a Section 7 case.70 To the majority, "any
section of the country" means any spot in the United States where
competition might be lessened. 71
65 Id. at 594.
66 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 59, 65-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

Compare the Court's earlier opinion, 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See Handler,
Gilding the Philisophic Pill-TradingBows for Arrows, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 1 (196).
67 See discussion in Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1955, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rrv.
825, 837-44 (1965).
68 AcEmsoN, MoR NG AND NooN .80 (1965).
69 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).

70 See Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymahing-Nineteenth Annual
Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92, 106-07 (1966).
71 "Congress did not'seem to be troubled about the exact spot where competition might

be lessened; it simply intended to outlaw mergers- which threatened competition in any
or all parts of the country." United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 US. 546, 549.
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My criticism is not directed merely to whether legislative history
supports this expansive interpretation or whether it is desirable as a
matter of policy to eliminate geographic market delineation as a threshold inquiry in merger litigation. My point rather is the wisdom of
adopting so far-reaching a rule when the facts of the case do not so
require, especially since the new principle is at variance with the
2
Court's prior doctrine.7
A corollary of the Court's proclivity for over-generalization is the
tendency to phrase its rules in absolute terms. "[R]estraints upon the
freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice and
discretion," writes Justice White in Pennington, ". . . run counter to
antitrust policy."7 3 To Justice Black, the "central policy of [the antitrust laws is] against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers
to buy in an open market."74 These dogmas appear to have a ring of
validity when stated abstractly; certainly antitrust seeks to protect economic freedom and open markets. But they cannot withstand careful
analysis.7 5 Every reasonable and ancillary restraint of trade impinges on
the economic freedom of the contracting parties; indeed the promisor
in every contract, regardless of its nature, restricts his freedom to act
thereafter according to his own choice and discretion. Justice Black's
Brown Shoe formulation casts doubt upon the validity of every exclusive dealing arrangement.
The indulgence in absolutes is justified by the Court as a means of
promoting certainty and ease of enforcement, and, of course, these are
important antitrust goals. No one will deny that by condemning all
contractual restraints and prohibiting all horizontal and vertical
mergers these goals can be attained. But are such total and unqualified
prohibitions wise or socially desirable? No one will deny that there is
a place for per se rules in antitrust in those situations where the condemned practice is always harmful without any redeeming feature or
the aggregate of harm far outweighs any possible benefit.7 0 But where
the conditions precedent for absolute rules are not present-and this is
true of large areas of antitrfist, especially mergers-we must not forget
that there are other values which must be served. Enforcement must be
72 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 870 U.S. 294, ,36- 49 (1962).
73 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,,668 (1965).
74 FTC V, Brown Shoe Co.,M84 U.S. 316, 321 (1966).
75 See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40: N.Y.U.L.

R.1V. 823, 834-5
(1965); Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust- Policymaking-Nineteenth Anlnual
Review, 76 YALE LJ. 92, 98-101 (1966).
70 See KAYSEN & TURNER, ArTRusx PoLIcy 142-44 (1959).
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fair as well as effective. The mechanical application of absolute interdictions leads to injustice, since they inevitably embrace conduct which
not only is not socially harmful but actually is socially beneficial. Moreover, without flexibility there can be no growth. This was the essence
of Cardozo's teaching when he asserted that "the judicial process is one
of compromise . . . between certainty and uncertainty, between the
literalism that is the exaltation of the written word and the nihilism
that is destructive of regularity and order." 77 Regrettably, we seem to
have abandoned the middle position and to be swinging from one
extreme to another.
In interpreting antitrust legislation, the Court at times starts with
the answer rather than with a question, 78 thus placing its own policy
predilections above statutory language and legislative history. Whether
its reading shall be limited or expansive seemingly depends on whose
ox is being gored. Take Schwegmann 79 as an example. The issue there
was whether the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act validated the tort as
well as the contract sanctions of state fair trade laws. The nonsigner
provisions of those statutes were held to be outside the scope of the
enabling federal legislation. In Sun Oil,8o Section 2(b) of the RobinsonPatman Act was limited to the meeting of the seller's own competition
and not as permitting assistance to customers to allow them to meet the
prices of their competitors. I am not suggesting that rational bases for
these interpretations are lacking, but I invite you to contrast the Court's
approach in those cases with that in Philadelphia National Bank.s
There, you will recall, the issue was whether Section 7 covered a consolidation of two banks. The-assets acquisition provision of the section
was inapplicable since banks are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission. To bring the consolidation within the
statute, it was accordingly necessary to treat it as a stock acquisition.
A court that can equate a consolidation of assets with a stock acquisition ought to have no difficulty in upholding a nonsigner clause or in
enlarging the scope of the meeting competition defense. Conversely, if
the words of an enactment must be read with grammatical precision, as
was true in Schwegmann, why not also in PhiladelphiaBank?
77 Cardozo, jurisprudence, 1932 N.Y. SrATE BAR Ass'N REP. 263, 284.
78 See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLtr.

I R v. 527,

529 (1947).

Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US. 384 (1951).
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
81 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 US. 321 (1963).
79

80
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82
Other examples come readily to mind-Minnesota Mining, where
an administrative action was converted into a "civil or criminal" proceeding "instituted by the United States" within the meaning of
83
Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act; and Dean Foods, where the Federal
Trade Commission, despite an overwhelming manifestation of contrary legislative intent, 4 was permitted to obtain preliminary relief
from the Courts of Appeals in merger cases under the provisions of the
All Writs Act. Is it captious to suggest that the Court selects the canon
of interpretation which will yield the desired result?
One frequently has the feeling in reading Supreme Court opinions
that the majority and the minority are deciding totally different cases.
There is virtually no dialogue. The reasoning of the dissenting justices
and the authorities they cite are repeatedly ignored. Issue is not even
joined as to what are the record facts. This, of course, is not always the
case, but it occurs often enough for the outsider to wonder whether
the dissents are even read by the majority.8 5 It may well be that the
dissenting arguments are not well founded, but is it not the duty of
the Court to meet them head-on? How can a ruling be properly analyzed and appraised when the contentions of the minority are disregarded?
In the Fall of 1966, at the dedication ceremonies at Rutgers Law
School, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a thoughtful address on the Future of
Legal Education, urged our law schools to bring to fruition the reforms
instituted some forty years ago by the adoption of the functional approach to the study of law. Both the Justice and I commenced our
teaching at approximately the same time-he at Yale and I at Columbia. At that time the faculties of both institutions were sharply divided.
The traditionalists were content to maintain and strengthen the advances brought about by the replacement of the text by the case system
of instruction at the turn of the century. They were proud of the
scientific nature of the inductive reasoning implicit in proceeding from
the particular to the general. They felt that the case system had resulted
in a material improvement of legal analysis and synthesis. The pro.
ponents of change felt that the prevailing methods of instruction and
82 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 881 U.S. 811 (1965).
83 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
84 See id. at 636-40 (Appendix to opinion of Fortas, J., dissenting).
85 E.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co.0,

384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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adjudication put undue stress on legal history and logic and accorded
insufficient attention to the functioning of legal rules in an ever
changing society. They measured the validity of any doctrine by the end
it sought to achieve. The jugular questions were whether the goals
were sound and the means efficient.
My own mentors-Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant and Karl
Llewellyn-thought that most judicial opinions were so unilluminating
that students were well advised to concentrate on the facts of each case
and to formulate their own principles. I never endorsed this extreme
view, although I must confess that I frequently found it easier to
understand and explain what courts did than what they said. It took
the genius of a Holmes to discern what should have been obvious-that
the major premises from which most rules are derived were inarticulate.
Functionalism was to change all of this. The focus was to be on how a
rule actually worked. If it worked well, we were not to be concerned
with its inherent illogic which might be attributable to historic accident.
Conversely; if it worked poorly, its logical symmetry was of little comfort. In short, the policy postulates of the law were to be explicit and
judicial candor the order of the day.
That one word--candor-illuminates what modern legal education
is all about. It is the distinctive feature of a mature jurisprudence. The
great jurists never ran away from the difficulties which a case presents;
they did not sweep embarrassing facts under the rug; they articulated
the reasons for their rules and formulated their premises and conclusions with meticulous accuracy. There was no fuzziness about what they
intended or what they did. All this, in brief, is what is meant when it is
said that the law is based on reason.
I hope you will not regard it as impertinent for me to ask how much
candor do the lower courts, the bar and the litigants get from the
Supreme Court today in antitrust? In an industry which is concentrated, we are told that slight increases in concentration spell illegality.86
Where an industry is not concentrated, it is asserted that there is a trend
towards concentration.8 7 Where no such trend is discernible, the Court
stresses the need to preserve the present structure of small, unconcentrated business. 8 Concentration is defined as an increase in the
market shares 6f the leading companies when such is the fact."0 When
86 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 279-81 (1964).
87 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 (1962).
88 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966).
89 United States v. Pliladelphia Nat'I Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363.65 (196).
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market shares have declined, concentration is given another meaning
-the disappearance of a competitor.9 0 What justification is there for
these shifts in rationale?
In Von's Grocery, the Court states that the purpose of Section 7 "was
to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business."0 1 It is not difficult
to move from such a premise to a holding that any horizontal merger
in a market in which the number of firms has decreased violates the
statute. And the next step would be for the Court to say that every
horizontal merger is unlawful. Is it the Court's view that every increase
in concentration, without more, inescapably results in a substantial
lessening of competition? What evidence supports any such conclusion?
On the first occasion on which it construed amended Section 7, the
Court unqualifiedly stated that each merger is unique, that its legality
depends upon all the facts and that unlawfulness is not to be determined by any slide-rule or mechanical formula. 92 Why has it, in each
subsequent case, moved more in the direction of the very per se prohibitions which it originally abjured? If the Court feels that it was
mistaken in its reading of the legislative record and that its statutory
interpretation in Brown Shoe was erroneous, why doesn't it frankly
say so? If it had in mind the rationale of Philadelphia Bant, Continental Can, Alcoa-Rome, Pabst and Von's at the time it decided Brown
Shoe, why did it sanction a diametrically opposite approach? Why
create the false impression that the later cases are the result of an
inexorable progression from Brown Shoe's premises? Why pretend to a
consistency which does not exist?
The issue to which I address myself is not whether one agrees or
disagrees with the Court's merger rulings. Despite my own disagree.
ments, I have repeatedly acknowledged that the verdict of history may
favor the Court's policies. 93 But if the Court intends to hold that all
horizontal mergers except in de minimis situations are to be forbidden,
it should be forthright and assume responsibility for the consequences
of so absolute and rigid a rule. It should not hide behind an unsupportable reconstruction of the legislative purpose.
In a recent address, the Chief of the Antitrust Division, Mr. Turner,
in defending the Von's Grocery decision, frankly admits that it would
90 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273, n.3 (1966).
91 Id. at 275.
92 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-23 (1962).
93 E.g., Handler, Atonality and Abstraction in Modern Antitrust Law, 52 AJ3.AJ. 621,

625 (1966).
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be impossible to demonstrate that the challenged merger had the
reasonable prospect of substantially lessening competition. 4 In his
opinion, an antimerger law basing legality upon a case by case evaluation of relevant economic facts would be wholly ineffective. He
accordingly hails the ruling for promoting certainty and facilitating
enforcement. Perhaps he is right. Perhaps Congress should have forbidden all horizontal acquisitions. 5 But isn't it relevant that this is
precisely what Congress refused to do in passing the Celler-Kefauver
Act?9 6 Is the Court warranted in transforming an antimerger law designed to protect competition into an anti-concentration measure without regard to competitive effects? I think not, both as a matter of the
proper relationship between the legislative and judicial branches of
government and as a matter of legal and economic policy.
Let me take one further illustration. Does Simpson"7 forbid any consignment contract between seller and buyer containing a price clause?
Does it forbid only broad networks of consignment arrangements? Or
does it hold that a coercively imposed consignment by a dominant
seller upon an unwilling buyer is unlawful? 8 Can anyone tell from
reading the Simpson opinion? Apart from the fact that the term
"coercion"' is employed as a conclusory epithet without the benefit of
factual content, are we not entitled to know whether the reference to
coercion is but a makeweight or the essential predicate of the ruling?
There is no excuse, I submit, for the Court to leave the reader in the
dark as to what is intended.
IV
When judges reject precedent, indulge in absolutes, exhibit impatience with rigorous analysis and do not confine their reforms to interstitial change, they do so, I believe, because they conceive of themselves
as makers of major policy.
I do not associate myself with those who fulminate against policy
94 Turner, Antimerger Policy, CCH TltnE Rmc. RE'.
50,165 at p. 55,218 (1967). 1I
will accept that in light of the present vigor of competition in the Los Angeles grocery
market, the break up of the Van's-Shopping Bag merger, in and of itself, made no great
contribution to the welfare of the Los Angeles housewife." Ibid.
95 Originally Section 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), applied in terms to stock acquisitions
resulting in a substantial lessening of competition between the acquiring and acquired
companies. But compare the Court's interpretation of this Section in International Shoe
Co. v. FTC, 280 US. 291, 298 (1930).
96 See Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Anti.
merger Act, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 629, 663-64 (1961).
97 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 US. 13 (1964).
98 See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-196!, 63 Mir. L. Rrv. 59 (1964).
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making by the courts. Courts could not avoid formulating policy even
if they wanted to. 0 The debatable issue is the extent and scope of judicial lawmaking. I belong to the school that believes that policy making
by courts should be of modest dimension. But I am enough of a realist
to recognize that, for the present at least, the views of that school are
in temporary eclipse. To me, therefore, the important thing is that the
Court make good policy. To this end it should receive the maximum
assistance of the bar and the law schools. 100 The practitioner must be
trained in preparing records and in making arguments which will
enable the courts to decide policy questions wisely. Training future
practitioners and judges in the delicate art of policy making will require revolutionary changes in both curriculum and teaching techniques-changes at least as far-reaching as those accomplished by the
functional approach.
It is only to underscore the obvious for me to point out that policy
making requires mastery over the relevant facts as well as wisdom. The
nine justices, able though they be, are not omniscient. They cannot be
specialists in every phase of law. They don't have all the answers and,
what is more important, the answers are not contained in any book.
Let's take the subject of industrial concentration. Is there any evidence that concentration, without more, is an unmitigated evil or that
it is always incompatible with effective competition? The experts are
not in agreement as to how concentration is defined, how it is measured, or even whether it is increasing or decreasing.1 01 Industries are
said to be concentrated where they consist of a limited number of firms.
What is a limited number? What is the dividing line? We hear a lot
of talk about efficiency and economies of scale. How does one determine
the optimum economic size of a company in any particular industry?
How is theory related to fact? And what about existing concentration?
Do we freeze the situation as it is, or do we deconcentrate, and if so,
102
how, when, where, and to what extent?
There are those like me who feel that courts, unlike the executive
99 See Jaffe, Was BrandeisAn Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, So HAY.

L. REv. 986 (1967); MURPHY, ELESIENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 1 (19641).
100 See Address by the author before a Seminar on the Training of the Practitioner,
Rutgers University School of Law, September 10, 1966.
101 Compare Testimony of John M. Blair, Willard F. Mueller 9 Carl Kaysen in Hearings Before Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of Senate Judiciary Committee
Pursuant to S. Res. 262 at pp. 77-78, 109-11, 540-51 (1964-65), with Testimony of M. A.
Adelman, J. Fred Weston and Jules Bachman, id. at pp. 223-30, 135-46, 560-76.
102 E.g., KAYsEN 8 TURNER, AN*nTRusr PoLIcy, Ch. IV (1959).
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or legislative branches of government, are unequipped to resolve these
imponderables. In a democratic society, the choice of policy might well
be left to the elected representatives of the people. But if the Court is
to make economic policy, should not its procedures be revised? Must
it not make certain that all the tools for sound policy determination
are available to it?
Many of you may be disturbed at the prospect of converting a trial
into an economic inquest.10 3 I submit, however, that it is preferable
to have policy made on the basis of a record in which the views of the
theorists are tested in the fire of cross-examination and where wishful
speculation can be differentiated from solid fact than to continue with
our present unscientific methods of relying on preconception, predilection, or mere hunch.
The points I have endeavored to make in this address are graphically illustrated by tvo decisions handed down during the recently
concluded Term of the Court. I am confining my discussion of these
rulings to the Court's methodology and am not pausing to consider
whether the cases were correctly decided.
04
was whether the district court had erred in
The issue in El Paso1
denying intervention to the appellants. Upon the remand from a prior
determination of the Supreme Court that El Paso's acquisition of
Pacific Northwest had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the district
court denied intervention to the objectants and entered a consent
decree that had been negotiated by the Department of Justice and the
defendant. The Supreme Court was not content to hold that intervention should have been permitted. It went on to review the merits of
the intervenors' objections, laid down binding guidelines to govern
the redrafting of the decree upon further remand, concluded that the
Department of Justice had "knuckled under to El Paso"'' 0 and that
the philosophy of the district court towards the decree was antithetical
to its own views, and then climaxed the reversal by directing the Chief
Judge of the Circuit to assign a different district judge to conduct further hearings in the case.' 00 Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a spirited dissent. 0 7 He sharply disagreed with the Court's construction of Rule
103

"The courts may be the principal guardians of the liberties of the people. They arc

not the chief administrators of its economic destiny." Baltimore & O.mlR v. United States,
386 US. 372, 478 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
104 Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 US. 129 (1967).
105 Id. at 141.
106 Id. at 142-43.
107 Id. at 143.
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24(a)(3), the intervention rule. He disagreed with the basic policy
predicates of the decision. He felt that the Court was wholly unjustified
in charging the Justice Department with dereliction of duty or serious
incompetence. He felt that the Court does not have the constitutional
power to second-guess decisions of the Attorney General made within
the bounds of his official discretion. He took the Court to task for
laying down guidelines with respect to complex issues on the basis of
what are in effect ex parte criticisms of the decree entered below. "In
so doing," he wrote, "the Court roams at large, unconfined by anything
so mundane as a factual record developed in adversary proceedings." 10 8
With respect to the removal of the district judge, his caustic comment
was: "For this Court, on its own motion, to disqualify a trial judge in
the middle of a case because it disagrees with his 'philosophy' is not
only unprecedented but incredible."' 0 9
I turn now to the other case, Procter & Gamble,'1 0 involving the
legality of a conglomerate or product extension merger. The Court
resisted the temptation to frame broad guidelines governing the legitimacy of conglomerate mergers. The decision rests upon the fact that
the industries of both the acquiring and acquired companies were
highly concentrated, that the acquired company dominated its field,
that the purchaser was one of the largest advertisers in the country,
that the effect of the acquisition would be to raise serious barriers to
the entry of new companies into the bleach industry and would dissuade the smaller firms now in that industry from aggressively competing, and further that Procter had been the most likely prospective
entrant and absent the merger would have remained on the periphery,
restraining Clorox in exercising its market power. The market extension merger, under the special circumstances of the case, was held
unlawful. The concurring Justice"' would have used the litigation as
a vehicle to lay down comprehensive guidelines governing the legality
of conglomerate acquisitions, but this the Court refused to do.
It is interesting to note that both opinions were written by the same
Justice. One case is decided on narrow grounds, the other touches upon
issues that seemingly were not before the Court. One purports to deal
only with the facts as found by the Federal Trade Commission, the
other rests on charges which were never litigated and as to which the
at 160.
109 Id. at 161.
110 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
108 Id.

111 Id. at 581 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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facts had not yet been determined. One rushes into the formulation
of guidelines, the other adheres to the admonition of the common law
that "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." The two cases thus
provide an interesting study in contrasting judicial techniques.

The extreme views against which I cavil---all restraints are unlawful;
all reciprocity is evil; all horizontal mergers are improper; all consignments with price agreements are anticompetitive; all exclusive dealing
arrangements are unfair-represent a distinctly minority view when
the totality of the Court's antitrust output is considered. Some 56
Justices have ascended the high bench since 1890, and a study of their
opinions and votes indicates, at least to me, that the preponderance of
them would not have gone along with these recent rulings. I often ask
myself: what is law? Is it nothing more than the idiosyncratic personal

conceptions of a few judges commanding a majority at a particular
point of time? Or is it a consensus predicated upon history, logic,
sociology, experience and, above all, common sense? Law is a continuum of the past, the present and the future--and the fleeting present
rapidly turns into history. The judicial philosophy of absolutism is
contrary to the common law tradition of moderation and balance.
Business arrangements are not necessarily evil simply because they are
attacked; some, of course, may be, but it is the task of a mature jurisprudence to separate the sheep from the goats. That is not always easy.
But the lesson I draw from our history is that the painstaking differentiation of human situations on the basis of their facts is the path
of justice. This need not proceed to the undue length of making our
rules inadministrable. There is a happy midway position. Incorrigible
optimist that I am, I believe that this is the path that will be followed
despite what I would like to believe are the aberrations of the present.
Both the Court and antitrust have great traditions. We have had
excellence in antitrust to a marked degree, both as regards doctrine
and the technique of decision. Perhaps in an imperfect world it is too
much always to demand excellence. I think not. It is because we have
learned to expect so much from the highest Court of the land and its
talented members that we do not hesitate to call it to task when it
departs from the traditions all of us cherish. After all, the Justices, like
all of us, look forward to a better tomorrow-a tomorrow guided by
the light of reason.
Let me conclude with the wise words of my mentor, Chief Justice
Stone:
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I have no patience with the complaint that criticism of judicial
action involves any lack of respect for the courts, When the courts
deal, as ours do, with great public questions, the only protection
against unwise decisions, and even judicial usurpation, is careful
112
scrutiny of their action and fearless comment upon it.

112 See 1960 Sup. CT. REv. at ii.
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